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An Analysis of the United Nations International




"You cannot qualify war in harsher terms than I will.
War is cruelty, and you cannot refine it."
William Tecumseh Sherman'
I. INTRODUCTION
Wartime atrocities against humankind have existed for millennia and are
a regrettable, yet attendant, component of any war. Certain acts of war have
always provoked outrage, although only recently has indignation at such acts
been expressed by uninvolved third parties.2 Enforcement by sovereign
States of the laws and customs of war has similarly existed for many years,
yet prosecuting the offenders has often been less than successful. As
Theodor Meron notes, "except in the case of a total defeat or
subjugation-for example, Germany after World War I-prosecutions of
enemy personnel accused of war crimes have been both rare and difficult."3
Indeed, the"Allied International Military Tribunal (IMT) established at
Nuremberg in 1945 would appear to be a true anomaly: no similar
international war crimes tribunal preceded it and none has followed.4
However, the past inability of the world community to establish a permanent
international criminal court that would, among other duties, prosecute those
who violate the laws of war, should not discourage the United Nations from
* J.D. Candidate, 1995, Indiana University School of Law, Bloomington; B.A. with High
Honors, 1991, Michigan State University.
1. JOHN BARTLETr, FAMILIAR QUOTATIONS 578 (Emily Morison Beck ed., 15th ed. 1980).
2. DONALD A. WELLS, WAR CRIMES AND LAWS OF WAR I (Social Philosophy Research
Institute Book Series No. 1, 1991).
3. Theodor Meron, The Case for War Crimes Trials in Yugoslavia, FOREIGN AFF., Summer
1993, at 122, 123. Meron is Professor of International Law at New York University Law School and
at the Graduate Institute of International Studies in Geneva.
4. Id. at 124-25.
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charging and attempting to prosecute those individuals responsible for the
appalling atrocities being committed in the former Yugoslavia. In a
laudable move, the Security Council on February 22, 1993, resolved to
create an international tribunal to prosecute the Yugoslav offenders;5 it
subsequently adopted the Statute of the International Tribunal on May 25,
1993.6 Unfortunately, almost six months passed before the Tribunal
convened its first session in The Hague on November 17, 1993. Further, the
session was primarily ceremonial and no actual business was conducted.7
Indeed, the fact that the Tribunal's first formal substantive session was
scheduled for April 24, 1994,8 almost one year after it was established,
seems to validate the beliefs of those who view the static Tribunal as a
wholly ceremonial body designed to appease the conscience of an
international community whose initial moral outrage at the atrocities has
gradually deteriorated into apathy and resigned acceptance.
Yet, should the Tribunal ever begin to deliberate in earnest, it will first
need to surmount a variety of hurdles not faced by its predecessor at
Nuremberg. The Tribunal's triers of fact are neither the victorious nations
nor do they represent victims of wartime atrocities in the former Yugoslavia.
Thus, they have no personal, vested interest in bringing the accused to trial.
Securing the defendants will be a much more difficult (if not impossible)
task than it was for the Allies after World War II. Obtaining probative
evidence will be a race against the ability of the violators to destroy
incriminating documents. Petty politicking and world disinterest may
eviscerate the potential mandate of the Tribunal, while the United Nations'
need to negotiate a peace settlement with the offenders themselves may very
well destroy any remaining incentive for the Tribunal to begin work in
earnest.
This Note contrasts and compares the nascent United Nations
International Tribunal to Adjudicate War Crimes Committed in the Former
Yugoslavia with the International Military Tribunal established by the Allies
at Nuremberg in 1945. What are the parallels between the two tribunals?
5. S.C. Res. 808, U.N. SCOR, 48th Sess., 3175th mtg., U.N. Doc. S/RES/808 (1993).
6. S.C. Res. 827, U.N. SCOR, 48th Sess., 3217th mtg., U.N. Doc. S/RES/827 (1993).
7. Jeffrey Bleich, We Must Not Let Ourselves Forget Bosnian War Crimes, L.A. DAILY J., Dec.
8, 1993, at 6.
8. Kriegsverbrecher-Tribunal in Den Haag: USA wollen Zeugenaussagen vorlegen; UNO-
Botschafterin Albright: Unaussprechliche Grausamkeiten, Silddeutsche Zeitung, Jan. 18, 1994, available
in LEXIS, World Library, SDZ File [hereinafter Kriegsverbrecher-Tribunal].
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Did both confront similar hurdles at their inception? Or did the creation of
each tribunal give rise to respectively unique problems? How much of a
substantive legal basis does the Nuremberg experience provide for the
United Nations International Tribunal? Finally, what are the prospects for
the current United Nations International Tribunal? Part II briefly examines
the events that led to the drafting of the London Charter, which created the
Allied International Military Tribunal, and then gives a general overview of
the Yugoslav conflict and of the U.N. action that created the current
Tribunal. Part III discusses the essence of the principles that evolved from
the Nuremberg trial, the problems inherent in the process, and the impact of
the Tribunal's actions. Part IV first outlines the jurisdictional bases of the
U.N. International Tribunal and then examines the hurdles the Tribunal must
overcome in order to ensure its effectiveness and legitimacy within the
world community. Part V concludes by examining the current status of the
United Nations International Tribunal and argues that the moral obligations
advanced in favor of pursuing the Tribunal's mandate outweigh the ominous
ramifications of doing nothing at all.
II. THE ESTABLISHMENT OF THE TRIBUNALS
A. Overview
The events that led to the creation of the International Military Tribunal
at Nuremburg (IMT) and the United Nations International Tribunal to
Adjudicate War Crimes Committed in the Former Yugoslavia were markedly
different. The IMT arose in the aftermath of a horrific world war where
both the Allies and Axis committed atrocities but where only the victors (the
Allies) prosecuted the vanquished (the Axis). The newly-created United
Nations had neither the resources nor the immediate worldwide support
necessary to establish a war crimes tribunal. Thus, the victorious Allies
were a natural choice to mete out some form of punishment.
In contrast, the current situation in the former Yugoslavia is a self-
contained war where the eventual "victor" (if, indeed, there is one) would
probably be the United Nations and not the Serbs or Bosnian Serbs, Croats,
or Muslims. The United Nations now has clear legal authority to prosecute
war criminals under its own charter, the 1948 Genocide Convention, the four
Geneva Conventions of 1949 and subsequent Additional Protocols I and II
of 1977, and the 1984 Torture Convention, among others. Furthermore, no
1994]
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other international organization has the influence or experience of the United
Nations. Thus, it is not surprising that the United Nations was the
preeminent force behind the establishment of an international tribunal to try
violators of the laws and customs of war in the former Yugoslavia.
B. The International Military Tribunal at Nuremberg
By late 1942, the Allied powers had begun to notice the various acts of
cruelty and barbarism that the Nazis were carrying out against Jews,9
Gypsies, Jehovah's Witnesses, and homosexuals.'0 On October 30, 1943,
American President Franklin Roosevelt, British Prime Minister Winston
Churchill, and Soviet Premier Joseph Stalin signed the Moscow Declaration,
in which the Allies formally resolved to prosecute war criminals."
However, there was no one common design for the punishment of the
defeated Nazis: the British and the Americans initially preferred summary
execution" while the French and Soviets were inclined to support the idea
of a trial. 3 Eventually, the United States altered its stance and, in a memo
dated April 30, 1945, argued that an execution-style judgment would be a
crass political act that might transform the Nazis into martyrs and provide
a platform for those intent on revitalizing national socialism.' 4  An
international trial "would provide an historical record, would help develop
international standards of legal conduct, and would serve as a deterrent to
future leaders contemplating similar actions."' 5
By the summer of 1945, the Allied powers' disagreements over
punishment had been reconciled and representatives of the United States, the
Soviet Union, France, and Great Britain met in London to formulate the
principles under which a trial of the major Nazi war criminals would be
9. Whitney R. Harris, A Call for an International War Crimes Court: Learning from
Nuremberg, 23 U. TOL. L. REv. 229, 237 (1992).
10. Steven Fogelson, Note, The Nuremberg Legacy: An Unfulfilled Promise, 63 S. CAL. L. REV.
833, 834 (1990). .
11. Robert Jackson, Report of Robert H. Jackson, United States Representative to the
International Conference on Military Trials, London, 1945, at I I-12 (United States Dept. of State Pub.
No. 3080, 1949), reprinted in Matthew Lippman, Nuremberg: Forty-Five Years Later, 7 CONN. J. INT'L
L. 1, 20 (1991).
12. Lippman, supra note II, at 20.
13. Fogelson, supra note 10, at 843.
14. Lippman, supra note II, at 21.
15. Id. at 21.
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conducted. On August 8, 1945, the United States, France, Great Britain, and
the Soviet Union signed the Agreement for the Prosecution and Punishment
of the Major War Criminals of the European Axis Powers. 6 This so-called
"London Agreement" constituted two parts: the Agreement itself, and the
Charter of the Tribunal. The Agreement advocated establishing an
international military tribunal for the trial of war criminals whose offenses
had no specific geographical location, 7 while the Charter, which was
annexed to the Agreement, set out the constitution, jurisdiction, and
functions of the envisioned tribunal. Provision was made for other Member
States of the United Nations to adhere to the Agreement, and by the
Nuremberg judgment date of October 1, 1946, nineteen such States had done
SO.1
8
The Allies agreed that the Tribunal would consist of four members, each
with an alternate; one member and one alternate were to be appointed by
each of the Agreement signatories. Decisions were to be by majority
vote, 19 conviction would require at least three affirmative votes, and the
Tribunal was to be in session for a one-year period.2" Article VI of the
Charter set out the three categories of crimes for which the accused Nazis
would be tried: 1) Crimes Against Peace-planning, initiating, and waging
wars of aggression, or in violation of treaties, or the conspiracy to do so;2
2) War Crimes-violations of the laws and customs of war with an
emphasis on ill-treatment of prisoners of war and civilians in occupied
countries; 22 and 3) Crimes Against Humanity-the murder of civilians
based on religious, political, or racial grounds. In addition to
enumerating the categories of crimes for which the accused Nazi leaders
would be tried, the Allies also specified in the Charter that 1) the principal
leaders of state were not exempt from prosecution; 2) obedience to superior
16. Agreement for the Prosecution and Punishment of the Major War Criminals of the European
Axis, Aug. 8, 1945, 59 Stat. 1544, 82 U.N.T.S. 279 [hereinafter Nuremberg Charter].
17. Harris, supra note 9, at 242-43.
18. Yugoslavia was one of the States. The others were Greece, Denmark, the Netherlands,
Czechoslovakia, Poland, Belgium, Ethiopia, Australia, Honduras, Norway, Panama, Luxembourg, Haiti,
New Zealand, India, Venezuela, Uruguay, and Paraguay. INTERNATIONAL MILITARY TRIBUNAL, TRIAL
OF THE MAJOR WAR CRIMINALS, I at 9 (1947), reprinted in Whitney R. Harris, Justice Jackson at
Nuremberg, 20 INT'L LAW. 867, 876 n.20 (1986).
19. Harris, supra note 9, at 243.
20. WELLS, supra note 2, at 99.
21. Harris, supra note 18, at 877.
22. WELLS, supra note 2, at 99.
23. Id. at 99-100.
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orders would not be a viable excuse, though in extenuating circumstances
it might mitigate a sentence; 24 3) accomplices were responsible for all acts
performed by any person in the course of a common plan or conspiracy to
commit a specific crime; 25 and 4) the Tribunal had the authority to declare
that a group or organization to which an accused belonged was a criminal
organization. 26 Further, the Tribunal was required to state the bases for its
findings of guilt and innocence, 21 and was accorded the right to impose any
punishment it deemed just, including execution. 28 The seat of the Tribunal
was established at Berlin,29 and Nuremberg was chosen as the place of trial
because of the availability of the Palace of Justice and its adjoining prison
in the suburb of Furth.3" The stage was set for the first day of trial,
November 20, 1945.3I
C. The United Nations International Tribunal to Adjudicate War Crimes
Committed in the Former Yugoslavia
The summer of 1991 was a volatile one for the former Yugoslavia.
Croatia and Slovenia declared independence on June 2532 and a sporadic
civil war began in Croatia between the majority Croats and the Serb
minority, who had the backing of the Serb-dominated Yugoslav Federal
Army. The political disputes between the federal Yugoslav government and
the governments of the individual republics that led to the secession of
Croatia and Slovenia also affected the republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina. This
Republic was a centrally-located region composed of 4.35 million people,
43.7% of whom were Slavic Muslims, 31.3% Serbs, and 17.3% Croats."
The Serb-dominated Yugoslav Federal Army, fearful of losing additional
24. Id. at 100.
25. Harris, supra note 9, at 243.
26. Lippman, supra note 11, at 26.
27. Nuremberg Charter, supra note 16, art. 26.
28. Id. art. 27.
29. Harris, supra note 9, at 243.
30. Harris, supra note 18, at 878.
31. Harris, supra note 9, at 244.
32. Charles L. Nier II1, Comment, The Yugoslavian Civil War: An Analysis of the Applicability
of the Laws of War Governing Non-International Armed Conflicts in the Modern World, 10 DICK. J.
INT'L L. 303, 310 (1992).
33. Zoran Pajit, The Conflict in Bosnia-Herzegovina, in VIOLATION OF FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS
IN THE FORMER YUGOSLAVIA 2 (The David Davies Memorial Institute of International Studies Occasional
Paper No. 2, Feb. 1993).
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territory to breakaway republics, especially crucial air base facilities and
arms production centers located in Bosnia-Herzegovina, increased its support
to the Bosnian Serbs, who began to take a hard-line approach in their
negotiations with secession-minded groups in Bosnia."
On October 15, 1991, the republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina proclaimed
its sovereignty and initiated the process to secede from what remained of
Yugoslavia.35 Pressure from all sides immediately began to mount upon
the Bosnian government. The European Community required that Bosnia
hold an independence referendum before it would recognize Bosnia as a
sovereign State. The Bosnian Serbs, knowing they had the support of the
Yugoslav Federal Army, were ready to resort to arms to prevent the republic
from seceding.36 Serbia, for its part, instituted an economic blockade
against Bosnia-Herzegovina in an effort to coerce the region to remain in the
now Serb-dominated Yugoslavia. 3' Nonetheless, the Bosnian government
proceeded with the independence referendum on March 1, 1992. The
Bosnian Serbs boycotted the vote,3" limiting the total turnout to only sixty-
three percent of Bosnia's total population. The ninety-nine percent majority
of voters in favor of independence was, therefore, not at all
representative. 39 The European Community formally recognized Bosnia-
Herzegovina as a sovereign State on April 6, 1992, effectively providing the
Serbs with a pretext to begin a full-scale assault against the fledgling
republic."
By the summer of 1992, the situation in Bosnia had deteriorated to such
a degree that, on July 29, Muhamed Sacirbey, Ambassador and Permanent
Representative of Bosnia and Herzegovina, sent a letter to the United
Nations Security Council requesting its intervention.4 Shortly thereafter,
34. Id. at 3.
35. John Webb, Note, Genocide Treaty-Ethnic Cleansing-Substantive and Procedural Hurdles
in the Application of the Genocide Convention to Alleged Crimes in the Former Yugoslavia, 23 GA. J.
INT'L & COMP. L. 377 (1993).
36. Pajid, supra note 33, at 3.
37. HELSINKI WATCH, WAR CRIMES IN BOSNIA-HERCEGOVINA 26 (1992), reprinted in Elizabeth
L. Pearl, Note, Punishing Balkan War Criminals: Could the End of Yugoslavia Provide an End to
Victors' Justice?, 30 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1373, 1382 (1993).
38. Paji6, supra note 33, at 3.
39. Webb, supra note 35, at 378.
40. Pajid, supra note 33, at 4.
41. Sacirbey also attached a list of 94 concentration camps and prisons in Bosnia-Herzegovina
and I I such camps in Serbia and Montenegro. Letter dated July 29, 1992, reproduced in U.N. Doc.
S/24365 (1992).
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the Security Council passed Resolution 771, paragraph five of which called
upon States and international humanitarian organizations to make available
to the Council any substantiated information in their possession or submitted
to them relating to the commission of human rights violations in the former
Yugoslavia.42 The United Nations Commission on Human Rights decided
to appoint a Special Rapporteur, Tadeusz Mazowiecki, the former Prime
Minister of Poland, to investigate violations of humanitarian law in the
former Yugoslavia (particularly in Bosnia-Herzegovina) and to provide a
preliminary report to the Secretary-General by August 28, 1992."3 His
report reached the obvious conclusion that most of former Yugoslavia,
especially Bosnia, was the "scene of massive and systematic violations of
human rights, as well as serious grave violations of humanitarian law," and
that harassment, discrimination, torture, and violence against the Muslim
population were commonplace."
The Security Council acted again in early October 1992, adopting
Resolution 780. It requested that the Secretary-General create an impartial
commission of experts to examine and analyze information collected in
accordance with Resolution 771, together with additional information
obtained through their own investigations. The experts were to provide the
Secretary-General with their conclusions on the human rights situation in the
former Yugoslavia.45  Pursuant to Resolution 780, Secretary-General
Boutros-Ghali appointed a five-member commission later that month.46
After repeatedly demanding that the warring parties in the former
Yugoslavia refrain from violating international humanitarian law and the
established customs and laws of war, the Security Council, on February 22,
1993, resolved to create an international tribunal to prosecute the offenders.
Additionally, it requested that the Secretary-General formulate a proposal to
carry out this resolution. 7 Some three months later, on May 25, 1993,
after having approved the Secretary-General's report, the Security Council
adopted the Statute of the International Tribunal. Its purpose was to
42. S.C. Res. 771, U.N. SCOR, 47th Sess., 3106th mtg., U.N. Doc. S/RES/771 (1992).
43. Alya Z. Kayal et al., The Forty-Fourth Session of the UN Sub-Commission on Prevention
of Discrimination and Protection of Minorities and the Special Session of the Commission on Human
Rights on the Situation in the Former Yugoslavia, 15 HUM. RTS. Q. 410, 415 (1993).
44. U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/1992/S-1/9, at 2-3 (1992), reprinted in Kayal, supra note 43, at 416.
45. S.C. Res. 780, U.N. SCOR, 47th Sess., 3119th mtg., U.N. Doc. S/RES/780 (1992).
46. Pearl, supra note 37, at 1376.
47. S.C. Res. 808, U.N. SCOR, 48th Sess., 3175th mtg., U.N. Doc. S/RES/808 (1993).
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prosecute those individuals responsible for serious violations of international
humanitarian law committed in the former Yugoslavia from January 1, 1991,
until the eventual restoration of peace.48
Unfortunately, the expectation that the Tribunal would convene shortly
after its creation, quickly establish rules of procedure and evidence, and
issue detailed indictments against known violators of human rights in the
former Yugoslavia, has never materialized into a reality. Politicking, 49 lack
of funds and personnel, and the world community's increasing resigned
acceptance of the rape camps, the forced sodomy and castration, and the
calculated ethnic cleansing of Muslims, have all allowed the Tribunal to
delay taking active steps to bring the war criminals to justice.5 °
The apparent apathy of the international community to the situation in
the former Yugoslavia has given the Tribunal an unclear mandate to
function as anything more than a ceremonial body. It was only in
September 1993 that eleven judges were elected by the General Assembly
to serve four-year terms expiring November 17, 1997." After a formal
opening ceremony in The Hague on November 17, 1993, the Tribunal
adjourned. It has since been working on its rules of procedure and
evidence,52 and is scheduled to hold its first formal, substantive session on
April 24, 1994.53 The delay has increased because the Tribunal's ability
to issue the necessary detailed indictments for violators of human rights in
the former Yugoslavia has been undermined by the recent resignation of the
U.N.-appointed prosecutor for the Tribunal. 4 A war crimes tribunal unable
to issue indictments and secure defendants is like a cobra in a glass cage:
48. S.C. Res. 827, U.N. SCOR, 48th Sess., 3217th mtg., U.N. Doc. S/RES/827 (1993).
49. Gary J. Bass, Courting Disaster: The UN. Goes Soft on Bosnia. Again., NEw REPUB., Sept.
6, 1993, at 12.
50. Bleich, supra note 7, at 6.
5I. Australian May Become UN. War Crimes Prosecutor, The Reuter Library Report, Jan. 28,
1994 (on file with the Indiana Journal of Global Legal Studies).
52. Id.
53. Kriegsverbrecher-Tribunal, supra note 8.
54. Ramon Escovar Salom, Venezuela's attorney general before his appointment to the Tribunal
in October of 1993, was named on January 31, 1994, to be Interior Minister in the new government of
Venezuelan President-elect Rafael Caldera. Salom was sworn in two days later. Gary Regenstreif,
Yugoslavia War Prosecutor Joins Venezuela Cabinet, Reuters, Jan. 31, 1994 (on file with the Indiana
Journal of Global Legal Studies). As a temporary replacement for Salom the United Nations appointed
his former deputy, Australian Graham Blewitt. Blewitt assumed his duties on February 14, 1994. Ex-
Yougoslavie: les suspects de crimes de guerre inaugureront la premiire maison d'arrit de i'ONU,
Agence France Presse, Jan. 27. 1994. available in LEXIS, Presse Library, AFP File [hereinafter Ex-
Yougoslavie].
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potentially threatening but inevitably harmless. Indeed, even if the Tribunal
should overcome these procedural hurdles, it still must confront other, more
formidable, substantive obstacles. Many questions are raised: What charges
will be filed against the defendants? What substantive law provides a valid
basis for the Tribunal's authority? How does one procure evidence before
it disappears forever? How does one ensure a fair and impartial trial? What
defenses should be allowed?
In 1945, the International Military Tribunal at Nuremberg confronted
these same questions. However, the IMT, because of its unique, precedent-
setting nature, was in the unenviable position of having to start from scratch
in all respects. The United Nations International Tribunal on the former
Yugoslavia is in no such position because the Allies at Nuremberg have
already set the stage. The legal authority for a war crimes tribunal, an issue
that implicated the very validity of the process and results at Nuremberg,
now has a firm grounding in the U.N. Charter itself, the codified Nuremberg
Principles, the Genocide Convention of 1948, the four Geneva Conventions
of 1949 and Additional Protocols I and'Il of 1977, the Torture Convention
of 1984, and other international law codifications adopted since 1945. The
nature of the defined crimes has expanded from "Crimes Against Peace,"
"War Crimes," and "Crimes Against Humanity" to include "grave breaches"
of certain fundamentals of international humanitarian law. Additionally, the
problem of ex post facto application of laws at the Nuremberg trial is no
longer an issue since the laws under which any future Yugoslav defendants
would be prosecuted were already in existence when such potential
defendants committed their crimes.
III. THE SUBSTANCE OF NUREMBERG
A. The Nuremberg Principles
The Nuremberg trial of major Nazi leaders was innovative for its time.
Despite various criticisms that questioned the legal validity and credibility
of the process at Nuremberg," the trial before the IMT and the numerous
later trials conducted by the American, British, and French in their
respective occupied zones, definitively established individual responsibility
55. See discussion infra part B.
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for war crimes, crimes against peace, and crimes against humanity. The
Nuremberg trials made clear that even the highest State official would be
liable for the systematic commission of gross violations of human rights.56
This return to fundamental principles of international law was a complete
rejection of "the extreme positivist assertion that the State, supreme within
its own sphere, sovereign and equal to other States in international law,
shields its officials from international sanction by virtue of State privileges
and immunities.
In late 1946, the United Nations General Assembly adopted Resolution
95(I), which approved and codified the principles of the Charter and
Judgment of the IMT at Nuremberg.58 The first Nuremberg Principle
stated that any individual who commits an act that constitutes a crime under
international law is personally responsible for the act and is subject to severe
penal sanction. 59 The fundamental rule underlying Principle I is that
"international law may impose duties on individuals directly without
interposition of internal law."'
The second Nuremberg Principle noted that "the fact that internal law
does not impose a penalty for an act which constitutes a crime under
international law does not relieve the person who committed the act from
responsibility under international law."161 An individual who has committed
an international crime that is punishable under international law is liable for
his act, regardless of the provisions of internal law-this principle is credited
with having established the "supremacy" of international law over national
law.
62
The Tribunal also ruled that individuals are accountable for crimes
committed by them as heads of State or as responsible government
officials.63 Under Principle III, the fact that a person acted in this capacity
while committing a gross violation of human rights does not relieve him
56. LYAL S. SUNGA, INDIVIDUAL RESPONSIBILITY IN INTERNATIONAL LAW FOR SERIOUS HUMAN
RIGHTS VIOLATIONS 48 (1992).
57. Id. at 48.
58. G.A. Res. 95(I), U.N. GAOR, 55th plen. mtg., at 188, U.N. Doc. A/64/Add.I (1946).
59. Harris, supra note 9, at 248.
60. ILC Rep. on the Formulation of Nirnberg Principles, [1950] 2 Y.B. INT'L L. COMM'N., U.N.
Doe. A/CN.4/22/1950, reprinted in M. CHERIF BASSIOUNI, CRIMES AGAINST HUMANITY IN
INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW 222 (1992).
61. Id. at 222.
62. Id.
63. Harris, supra note 9, at 249.
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from international responsibility. Indeed, the Tribunal explicitly rejected the
concept that wars are fought by States, which alone must answer for their
consequences, and instead held that leaders who plan and wage aggressive
war or direct others to commit crimes must answer personally for their
actions."
Principle IV stated that "the fact that a person acted pursuant to an order
of his Government or of a superior does not free him from responsibility
under international law. It may, however, be considered in mitigation of
punishment, if justice so requires.""5 The idea is that "superior's orders"
is not a defense, provided that a moral choice was possible at the time the
crime was committed.
Finally, Principle V addressed the issue of fairness and impartiality
during a trial conducted for gross violations of international humanitarian
law. Individuals charged with war crimes should not be dealt with
summarily, but rather should have a fair trial during which they are
presumed innocent until evidence establishes guilt beyond a reasonable
doubt. This principle lessens the likelihood that petty revenge will supplant
justice."
B. The Legacy of Nuremberg
The Nuremberg Principles have had a profound impact on international
criminal, jurisprudence. Not only have the principles established by
Nuremberg been incorporated into many domestic legal systems, 67 but they
have also influenced the Charter of the United Nations68 and the meaning
and legal status of many of the norms69 found in the 1948 Genocide
Convention,7° the four 1949 Geneva Conventions and their 1977 Additional
64. Id.
65. ILC Rep. on the Formulation of Ndimberg Principles, supra note 60, reprinted in SUNGA,
supra note 56, at 49 n.71.
66. Harris, supra note 9, at 249.
67. SUNGA, supra note 56, at 49.
68. The United Nations was created primarily by the United States, the Soviet Union, Great
Britain, and France, the same actors who drafted the Nuremberg Charter. Both charters are directly
derived from the Moscow Declaration of October 30, 1943, and it is thus not surprising that several of
the principles contained in the Nuremberg Charter are also evident in the United Nations Charter.
Fogelson, supra note 10, at 871.
69. SUNGA, supra note 56, at 50.
70. Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, Dec. 9, 1948, 78
U.N.T.S. 1021 [hereinafter Genocide Convention].
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Protocols I and II,7' and the 1984 United Nations Convention Against
Torture.72 The norms apparent in these and other multilateral human rights
treaties adopted since Nuremberg are evidence that the majority of nations
recognize the significance of the Nuremberg Principles in contemporary
international law.73
The Nuremberg Charter by itself, however, is neither a true precedent
in international law nor very strong authority for the principle of individual
responsibility for war crimes.7a Although the IMT at Nuremberg was
international,
[i]n the sense that it was the creation of more than one State, was
not part of the judicial system of any one State, and it applied
international, rather than national law, the fact that none of the
Judges were of a nationality of one of the defeated States or even
of a neutral State, contradicts the notion that the Tribunal was truly
international in character.75
The partiality of the IMT is thus more indicative of ad hoc national military
tribunals and not of a truly impartial international tribunal such as the
United Nations International Tribunal.76
There are additional, purely formal reasons why the judgment of the
Nuremberg Tribunal is not a precedent in international law. A true
precedent has binding force upon later adjudications of a similar nature.
71. Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded and Sick in
Armed Forces in the Field, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3114, 75 U.N.T.S. 31 [hereinafter Geneva
Convention 1]; Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of Wounded, Sick and Shipwrecked
Members of Armed Forces at Sea, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3217, 75 U.N.T.S. 85 [hereinafter Geneva
Convention I!]; Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War, Aug. 12, 1949, 6
U.S.T. 3316, 75 U.N.T.S. 135 [hereinafter Geneva Convention Iil]; Geneva Convention Relative to the
Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3516, 75 U.N.T.S. 287
[hereinafter Geneva Convention IV]; Geneva Protocol I Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12
August 1949, and Relating to the Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts, June 8, 1977,
1125 U.N.T.S. 3 (1979) [hereinafter Protocol I]; Geneva Protocol 11 Additional to the Geneva
Conventions of 12 August 1949, and Relating to the Protection of Victims of Non-International Armed
Conflicts, June 8, 1977, 1125 U.N.T.S. 609 (1979) [hereinafter Protocol II].
72. Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or
Punishment, G.A. Res. 39, U.N. GAOR, 39th Sess., Supp. No. 51, at 197, U.N. Doc. A/39/708 (1984)
'hereinafter Torture Convention].
73. Fogelson, supra note 10, at 875.
74. SUNGA, supra note 56, at 32.
75. Id.
76. Id. at 33.
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However, the IMT was not a permanent court and no other international
court with permanent criminal jurisdiction over individuals has been created
since Nuremberg. Thus, the judgment of the IMT cannot constitute a truly
binding and authoritative precedent in international law."
Nonetheless, the consensus today is that the Nuremberg Principles
themselves are an integral component of general international law and that
individual responsibility for war crimes has become widely accepted as an
international legal norm, despite the lack of a permanent judicial body to
enforce it.7" Thus, the Nuremberg Principles, in conjunction with the U.N.
Charter, the Genocide, Geneva, and Torture Conventions, various
international criminal law codifications, and recent U.N. Resolutions
addressing the situation in Bosnia-Herzegovina, provide sufficient legal
justification to indict, arrest, and prosecute those individuals in the former
Yugoslavia who have either committed or sanctioned barbaric acts in direct
violation of international human rights law and the laws and customs of war.
IV. THE UNITED NATIONS INTERNATIONAL TRIBUNAL TO
ADJUDICATE WAR CRIMES COMMITTED IN THE FORMER YUGOSLAVIA:
CORRECTING NUREMBERG'S DEFECTS,
CONFRONTING NEW CHALLENGES
Despite the general acceptance by the world community of the human
rights concepts embodied by the Nuremberg Principles, the war crimes trial
itself still remains controversial. Most of the criticism concerns the
unprecedented nature of the Nuremburg proceedings, the possible lack of
judicial impartiality, and the prosecution and conviction of the Nazi leaders
for violating the novel legal doctrine of Crimes Against Peace.7 9 Indeed,
the ex post facto application of Allied-formulated laws, the tenuous legal
foundation for the Tribunal's existence and authority, and the presence on
the bench of judges from nations that had just vanquished the defendants in
a bloody, prolonged war, are all factors that have tended to diminish the
validity and impact of the Nuremberg precedent.
Fortunately, the new U.N. International Tribunal has neither the problem
of legal justification that plagued the Nuremberg indictments nor the concern
77. Id.
78. Id. at 35.
79. Lippman, supra note II, at 63.
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of "victors' justice" that implicated the impartiality and fairness of the
Nuremberg trials as a whole. A sufficient legal basis to indict and prosecute
Yugoslav war criminals exists in the numerous Conventions, Protocols, and
international humanitarian law codifications that have entered into force
since 1945. The United Nations itself, through its Charter and recent
Resolutions on the Yugoslav conflict, has uncontested authority to create a
war crimes tribunal. Further, because the United Nations is an impartial
body representative of the international community at large, it is not
susceptible to charges of meting out "victors' justice."
Nonetheless, the newly-created Tribunal confronts obstacles foreign to
its Nuremberg counterpart. Evidence of human rights violations is either
scarce or rapidly disappearing, the ability to apprehend violators is doubtful,
and the effectiveness of the Tribunal has been undermined by lack of
funding, personnel, and world interest. Indeed, the very existence of the
Tribunal is vulnerable to the overriding desire of the United Nations to
effect a comprehensive peace agreement for the region. Thus, any
negotiations most probably will include granting amnesty to war crimes
offenders. The remainder of this Note will address 1) the legal bases
available to the U.N. International Tribunal; 2) the obstacles the U.N.
Tribunal will need to surmount in order to validate its mandate; and 3) the
prospects for the creation of a permanent international criminal court that
would have jurisdiction over war crimes and other offenses.
A. Jurisdictional Bases
1. The Charges
The world community has known for some time of atrocities committed
in the former Yugoslavia, particularly in Bosnia-Herzegovina. Torture,
summary executions, internment in concentration camps reminiscent of Nazi
Germany, systematic mass rape, forced prostitution, inhuman treatment of
prisoners and civilians, and destruction or confiscation of private property
not justified by military necessity have all been documented and would
qualify as war crimes under Nuremberg, customary international law, and
the "grave breaches" provisions of the 1949 Geneva Conventions and 1977
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Additional Protocols I and II thereto.80 Further, the fact that these crimes
have been committed on a mass scale implicates charges of genocide and
crimes against humanity."
Many, if not all, of these crimes are the result of the "ethnic cleansing"
of Bosnia-Herzegovina by Bosnian Serbs. Professor Meron defines this
practice as consisting of:
Harassment, discrimination, beatings, torture, summary executions,
expulsions, forced crossings of the lines between combatants,
intimidation, destruction of secular and religious property, mass and
systematic rape, arbitrary arrests and executions, deliberate military
attacks on civilians and civilian property, uses of siege and cutting
off essential supplies destined for civilian populations.82
Although ethnic cleansing has existed in one form or another for more than
2700 years,8 3 it was only toward the beginning of the twentieth century that
the complete destruction of an ethnic group became an actual goal of some
States. 4
The current practice of ethnic cleansing in the former Yugoslavia has
focused particular attention on rape as a punishable crime of violence.
Overwhelming evidence of mass rape perpetrated against Bosnian Muslim
women 5 has resulted in an increased readiness to clarify the status of rape
as a crime under international humanitarian law. 6 Although rape is not
listed as a "grave breach" of fundamental rights under the Fourth Geneva
Convention or Additional Protocol I, it is explicitly prohibited by both.87
Additionally, there is a growing recognition in the world community that
rape committed during war falls under the Nuremberg Tribunal's definitions
of war crimes and crimes against humanity.88 Similarly, rape used as a
80. Meron, supra note 3, at 131. See infra part A.3.f. for a description of "grave breaches."
81. Id. at 131.
82. Id. at 132.
83. Andrew Bell-Fialkoff, A Brief History of Ethnic Cleansing, FOREIGN AFF., Summer 1993,
at 110, 111-13.
84. In 1894, Turkish regular troops and Kurds jointly killed 200,000 Armenians; in 1915 the
Armenians lost another 1.5 million people-more than half of their population-in addition to 90% of
their ethnic territory. Id. at 113.
85. The number of women raped is estimated at 30,000-50,000. Id. at 119.
86. Meron, supra note 3, at 131.
87. Id.
88. However, there still exists a certain reticence to classify rape, enforced prostitution, and other
sexual assaults against women as war crimes or crimes against humanity when the offenses are viewed
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tool of ethnic cleansing would constitute a form of crimes against humanity
and possibly even a form of genocide if the rape is part of a campaign to
destroy a religious or ethnic group.8 9
2. The Conflict in the Former Yugoslavia as an International War
Whether international humanitarian law as embodied in the Nuremberg
Principles and successor human rights conventions applies to the current
atrocities in Bosnia-Herzegovina may depend on whether that region's
apparent "civil" war qualifies as a truly "international" conflict. Clarifying
the status of the conflict is crucial, for the norms of humanitarian law differ
in their treatment of war categorized as international or internal.9°
Traditional international law recognized the three following basic
categories of internal conflict: rebellion, insurgency, and belligerency.9 '
However, this system of classifying internal war has become largely useless
today for three reasons. First, nations have tended to avoid express
bestowals of status upon the factions involved in an internal war.92
Second, the lack of a centralized authority for making and processing claims
under the three internal conflict categories has prevented the development
of standards for differentiation between permitted and forbidden acts.93
Third, major State actors have rejected in practice and doctrine the policy
of impartiality under the traditional international law system, instead
choosing to support wars of national liberation, which makes adherence to
the established rules a self-destructive act for the remainder of the world
community.94
In light of the foregoing, it is not surprising that a new, more flexible
international law approach toward civil war has developed.95  This
approach seeks to promote and facilitate the classification of a civil war
within a specific context that allows the establishment of governmental
on their own and not as a component of ethnic cleansing. Beth Stephens, Women and the Atrocities of
War, HUM. RTS., Summer 1993, at 12, 13.
89. Terry Atlas, UN Will Pursue War Crimes Trials for Bosnia, CHI. TRIB., Jan. 30, 1994, at I.
90. Stephens, supra note 88, at 13.
91. RICHARD A. FALK, LEGAL ORDER IN A VIOLENT WORLD 117 (1968).
92. Id. at 124.
93. Id. at 124-25.
94. Id. at 125.
95. Nier, supra note 32, at 330.
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interaction between the opposing parties to the conflict.96 The goal is to
reach an agreeable intermediate position between the factions97 by
encouraging the exchange of claims and counterclaims from both sides98
and recommending policy prescriptions involving possible third-party
intervention.99
Despite the fact that none of the parties to the conflict in the former
Yugoslavia has established a mutually acceptable policy conducive to
"legislative interaction" under this new approach, and probably will not do
so until a peace accord is reached,'00 the consensus in the world
community is that the fighting in Bosnia still constitutes an international
armed conflict to which the laws of war and the rules governing war crimes
are applicable.'0 ' Not only have all sides to the conflict agreed to honor
the broader, more detailed norms that govern international conflicts,0 2 but
the United Nations Commission of Experts appointed by the Secretary-
General in October of 1992 has also concluded that the standards applicable
to international conflicts should apply in this case.0 3  Thus, the
applicability of international humanitarian law to the conflict in the former
Yugoslavia is a moot point.
3. The Legal Precedent Available to the U.N. Tribunal
a. Introduction
An initial issue and one of primary concern is whether the international
agreements signed by the former Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia
(SFRY) are binding on the new independent States created by its
dissolution, namely Croatia, Slovenia, the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia
(Serbia and Montenegro), and Bosnia-Herzegovina."' 4 The SFRY ratified
the 1948 Genocide Convention,'05 the four 1949 Geneva Conventions on
96. Id.
97. Id.
98. Id. at 328.
99. Id. at 329.
100. Id.
101. Meron, supra note 3, at 128.
102. Stephens, supra note 88, at 13.
103. Id.
104. Geoff Gilbert, Punishing the Perpetrators, NEW L.J., Sept. II, 1992, at 1237.
105. Genocide Convention, supra note 70.
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the Laws of War"° and the Additional Protocols I and 11, 107 the 1954
Hague Convention on Cultural Property," 8  and the 1984 Torture
Convention. °
However, State accession to treaties ratified by predecessor States is
ordinarily not automatic except in relation to those treaties that involve pre-
existing international boundaries."0  Nonetheless, it is arguable that all
successor States are presumed to accept the international humanitarian law
obligations of their predecessor States, although no such binding requirement
exists."'
In pacts concluded on November 27, 1991, and May 22, 1992, Croatia,
Serbia, and all the parties involved in the Bosnia-Herzegovina conflict
agreed to honor the majority of the protective provisions of the 1949 Fourth
Geneva Convention and the 1977 Additional Protocol I, except those
sections listing "grave breaches.""' 2  However, this exclusion is to no
avail: Professor Meron notes that the Fourth Geneva Convention as a whole
"4concerns customary law and, in many respects, even peremptory norms that
cannot be excluded by agreements.""' 3 In addition, all States involved in
the conflict have agreed to be bound by the obligations of the former
Yugoslavia under the four Geneva Conventions and have accepted the
"Statement of Principles" declared by the London Conference on Yugoslavia
on August 26, 1992, "concerning compliance with international humanitarian
law and personal responsibility for violations of the conventions."" ' 4
4, second concern that should be addressed is the issue of improper ex
post facto prosecution of war criminals. Critics of the Nuremberg trials
viewed the application of international humanitarian law to the Nazi leaders
as retroactive in violation of the principle nulla poena sine lege (no
punishment without law), whose purpose is to protect against liability for
acts committed without belief that they were illegal when performed." 5
106. Geneva Conventions 1, I!, 111, IV, supra note 71.
107. Protocols I and II, supra note 71.
108. Convention for the Protection of Cultural Property in the Event of Armed Conflict, May 14,
1954, 249 U.N.T.S. 240 (1956).
109. Torture Convention, supra note 72.
110. Gilbert, supra note 104, at 1237.
111. Id.
112. Meron, supra note 3, at 129.
113. Id.
114. Id.
115. Walter W. Brudno, The Nuremberg Experience, 19 TEX. INT'L L.J. 633, 641 (1984).
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Today, however, the principle of individual responsibility under international
humanitarian law for serious human rights violations is generally accepted,
as is the list of treaty and customary provisions that defines war crimes and
crimes against humanity." 6 Punishment by the ex post facto application
of law is thus not an issue for the U.N. International Tribunal.
b. The Hague Conventions of 1907
The Hague Conventions of 1907 were fundamental in the evolutionary
process of the laws of war and represented the beginning of international
legal recognition of war crimes and crimes against humanity."' Of the
many Hague Conventions, the most important was undoubtedly The Hague
Convention IV of 1907 Respecting the Laws and Customs of War on
Land," 8 which codified the principles of war on land and set out a basic
international normative core for the later Nuremberg trials." 9 Although
the former Yugoslavia was not formally a party to The Hague Convention
IV of 1907, it did ratify The Hague Convention II of 1899, which was the
forerunner to the later Hague Convention IV and contains many similar
provisions. 2° In addition, the Nuremberg International Military Tribunal
specifically recognized the 1907 pact as declaratory of customary
international law and thus binding on all nations, regardless of their
signatory status.121
c. The Nuremberg Precedent
The U.N. International Tribunal derives additional legal justification
from the codified Nuremberg Principles and from the Nuremberg Charter's
three categories of offenses (Crimes Against Humanity, War Crimes, Crimes
Against Peace). 22 The application of these categories to the atrocities in
116. Meron, supra note 3, at 126.
117. Mich~le Jacquart, La notion de crime contre l 'Hurmanit en droit internatioial con teniporain
el en droit canadien, 21 REV. GEN. 607, 616 (1990).
118. Hague Convention IV of 1907 Respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land, Oct. 18,
1907, 3 Martens Nouveau Recueil (ser. 3) (1862-1910) 461-503.
119. Meron, supra note 3, at 127.
120. Pearl, supra note 37, at 1386 n.86.
121. Id.
122. For a more detailed discussion of the codified Nuremberg Principles themselves, see
discussion supra part lII.A.
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the former Yugoslavia should present few problems. "Crimes Against
Humanity," encompassing murder, enslavement, deportation, other inhumane
acts committed during war, and persecution of civilians based on political,
racial, or religious grounds,'23 would apply to the current widespread
practices of ethnic cleansing and mass rape in Bosnia. Proof of systematic
governmental planning of the atrocities is required; however, the character
and evident systematic nature of many of the crimes in Bosnia 124 more
than attest to the obvious Bosnian Serb and Serbian governmental roles.
"War Crimes," violations of the laws and customs of war by soldiers
and civilians including murder, murder or ill-treatment of prisoners of war,
killing of hostages, and wanton destruction of cities, towns, and
villages, 125 would apply to the atrocities committed in concentration camps
throughout the former Yugoslavia and to general human rights violations
and destruction of cities (e.g., Sarajevo) not justified by military necessity.
War crimes require no proof of systematic governmental planning of the
offenses. 126
"Crimes Against Peace," defined in article 6(a) of the Nuremberg
Charter as planning, initiating, or waging a war of aggression, or a war in
violation of international treaties or agreements,121 usually concern only
high-ranking members of the military or the executive of the State.'
28
This category of crimes could apply to both the Serbian and Croatian leaders
who started the war'29 and to the Bosnian Serb military commanders or
government executives who have prolonged the conflict.
d. The United Nations Charter
The United Nations Charter, formed simultaneously with the Nuremberg
Charter, embodies several of the Nuremberg Principles 30 and provides
additional legal justification for the U.N. International Tribunal. The U.N.
Charter states that "all Members shall refrain in their international relations
123. Nuremberg Charter, supra note 16, art. 6(c).
124. Meron, supra note 3, at 130.
125. Nuremberg Charter, supra note 16, art. 6(b).
126. Meron, supra note 3, at 130.
127. Nuremberg Charter, supra note 16, art. 6(a).
128. Gilbert, supra note 104, at 1238.
129. Id.
130. See supra note 68.
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from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political
independence of any state."'' Article 39 authorizes the U.N. Security
Council to decide what measures must be taken for the maintenance of
international peace and security,'32 while article 41 lists possible
enforcement measures. 3  Establishing an ad hoc international war crimes
tribunal to prosecute gross human rights abuses in the former Yugoslavia
would be an appropriate enforcement measure under article 41 for the
maintenance and restoration of international peace and security in the
region. 14 Although the majority of atrocities are due to ethnic tensions
that undoubtedly will endure even after a peace settlement is reached, the
establishment of a tribunal that can sanction individuals who violate
international humanitarian law would effectively punish the offenders,
contribute to restoring and maintaining international peace and security, and
serve the peacekeeping function of the Security Council set forth in U.N.
Charter articles 24 and 39 
35
e. The Genocide Convention of 1948
Genocide, "the deliberate and systematic destruction of a racial, political,
or cultural group,"'136 is conceptually linked to crimes against humanity but
has been accorded special attention only since the extermination of 6 million
Jews during the Nazi regime. ' Because there is no internal source of
control or punishment when a State itself engages in genocide, any
punishment necessarily must come from outside the State-this is where
international law has a role to play.
13
On December 11, 1946, the United Nations General Assembly, with the
Holocaust and the Nuremberg prosecutions as background, unanimously
adopted Resolution 96(I), which established "genocide" as a crime under
131. U.N. CHARTER art. 2, para. 4.
132. U.N. CHARTER art. 39.
133. U.N. CHARTER art. 41.
134. Report'on the International Tribunal to Adjudicate War Crimes Committed in the Former
Yugoslavia, 1993 A.B.A. SEC. INT'L L. & PRAc. (July 8, 1993).
135. Id. at 10; U.N. CHARTER, supra note 131, arts. 24, 39.
136. WEBSTER'S NINTH NEW COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY 511 (1987).
137. Barbara Harff, Genocide and Human Rights: International Legal and Political Issues, at II -
12, in MONOGRAPH SERIES IN WORLD AFFAIRS (Graduate School of International Studies, University of
Denver, volume 20, book 3. 1984).
138. Id. at 10.
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international humanitarian law that entails the national and international
responsibility of individual persons and States. 139 The General Assembly,
on December 9, 1948, adopted a draft of the Convention on the Prevention
and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, 4 ' which came into force on
January 12, 1951. Yugoslavia was one of the original signatories (August
29, 1950). 4 1
The Genocide Convention, as the first and perhaps most important of the
instruments the General Assembly passed shortly after Nuremberg,
established the basic premises that have guided the development of a system
of international criminal law.' 42 Article I affirms that genocide, "whether
committed in time of peace or in time of war, is a crime under international
law" that ratifying parties must prevent and punish. 43 On the other hand,
article II, the substantive core of the Genocide Convention, defines
"genocide" as a variety of acts committed with the
intent to destroy, in whole or in part, a national, ethnical, racial or
religious group, as such:
a) Killing members of the group;
b) Causing serious bodily or mental harm to members of the
group;
c) Deliberately inflicting on the group conditions of life calculated
to bring about its physical destruction in whole or in part;
d) Imposing measures intended to prevent births within the group;
e) Forcibly transferring children of the group to another group. 44
The word "intent" is key: without the requisite intent to destroy a group,
the heinous act cannot qualify as genocide.
45
Does the practice of ethnic cleansing in the former Yugoslavia provide
an appropriate situation for the application of article II of the 1948 Genocide
Convention? Is there a sufficient legal justification? One could argue "yes"
to both questions for the following three reasons: 1) there is an established
139. See G.A. Res. 96(1), U.N. Doe. A/231 (1946).
140. Genocide Convention, supra note 70.
141. Webb, supra note 35, at 387 n.53.
142. Lippman, supra note 1I, at 48.
143. Genocide Convention, supra note 70, art. I.
144. Id., art. II.
145. Iu. A. Reshetov, Development of Norms of International Law on Crimes Against Humanity,
in THE NUREMBERG TRIAL AND INTERNATIONAL LAW 199, 202 (George Ginsburgs & V.N. Kudriavtsev
eds., 1990).
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and identifiable national, ethnic, racial, or religious group as the victim; 2)
there is an obvious intent to destroy the group or groups in whole or in part;
and 3) there are identifiable acts in conjunction with the intent to destroy the
identified group victim. 146
Bosnian Muslims, Croats, and Serbs are distinguishable as separate
religious, ethnic, national, and cultural groups and, as such, are identifiable
victims who fall under article II's definition of a "group."' 47 Furthermore,
the practice of ethnic -cleansing by paramilitary forces against the Bosnian
Muslims, Croats, and Serbs, when not motivated by political or territorial
gain but rather by an intent to eradicate the civilian population of a group
victim within the meaning of article II, qualifies as the sanctionable crime
of genocide. 48 Finally, the heinous acts of civilian killings, torture, mass
and systematic rape in detention centers and elsewhere, the creation of
refugees, terrorization, and the calculated slaughter of males together with
the systematic rape of women within a defined group as a means of
preventing further births within that group, clearly fall within the list of
genocidal acts set out in article II.
14 9
f The 1949 Geneva Conventions and 1977 Additional Protocols I
and H
The four 1949 Geneva Conventions and subsequent Protocols I and II
provide an additional legal basis for the U.N. International Tribunal to bring
charges against violators of human rights in the former Yugoslavia. Thesetreaties, each of which the f6rmer Yugoslavia ratified, generally provide
additional formal protection for the wounded and sick, 5° prisoners of
war,151 and civilians.' They also further codify international war
crimes law by labelling violations of certain basic human rights norms as
"grave breaches,"'5 namely:
146. Webb, supra note 35, at 399.
147. Id. at 399-400.
148. Id. at 400-01.
149. Id. at 402-03.
150. Geneva Conventions I and II, supra note 71.
151. Geneva Convention Il, supra note 71.
152. Geneva Convention IV, supra note 71.
153. Meron, supra note 3, at 129.
[Vol. 2:233
UNITED NATIONS WAR CRIMES TRIBUNAL
Willful killing, torture, or inhuman treatment, including biological
experiments, willfully causing great suffering or serious injury to
body or health, extensive destruction and appropriation of property
not justified by military necessity, unlawful deportation or transfer,
and unlawful confinement.15 4
Two of the four Geneva Conventions are particularly applicable to the
victims of ethnic cleansing in the former Yugoslavia. The Geneva
Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War (Geneva
Convention III) states that "prisoners of war must at all times be
humanely treated"; 5 6 that "women shall be treated with all the regard due
their sex"; 57 and that "the basic daily food rations shall be sufficient in
quantity, quality and variety to keep prisoners of war in good health and to
prevent loss of weight or the development of nutritional deficiencies."'5
These specific provisions directly implicate conditions in the numerous
detention centers and concentration camps spread across Bosnia and outlying
areas.
The Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons
in Time of War (Geneva Convention IV)' 59 proscribes "individual or mass
forcible transfers, as well as deportations of protected persons from occupied
territory to the territory of the Occupying Power or to that of any other
country,"'" in addition to "any destruction by the Occupying Power of
real or persoffal property belonging individually or collectively to private
persons, or to the State.'' These provisions would apply to the forced
removal and deportation of Bosnian Muslims and to the extensive
destruction and appropriation of private property belonging to Bosnian
Muslims by Bosnian Croats and Serbs.
Finally, the two protocols later annexed to the original four Geneva
Conventions of 1949 provide further legal justification for prosecuting those
responsible for the commission of atrocities in the former Yugoslavia. The
154. Geneva Convention 1, supra note 71, art. 50; See also Geneva Convention II, supra note 71,
art. 51; Geneva Convention IlI, supra note 71, art. 130; Geneva Convention IV, supra note 71, art. 147.
155. Geneva Convention III, supra note 71.
156. Geneva Convention III, supra note 71, art. 13, quoted in Pearl, supra note 37, at 1394.
157. Geneva Convention III, supra note 71, art. 14, quoted in Pearl, supra note 37, at 1394.
158. Geneva Convention III, supra note 71, art. 26, quoted in Pearl, supra note 37, at 1394.
159. Geneva Convention IV, supra note 71.
160. Geneva Convention IV, supra note 71, art. 49, quoted in Pearl, supra note 37, at 1394.
161. Geneva Convention IV, supra note 71, art. 53, quoted in Pearl, supra note 37, at 1394-95.
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1977 Protocol Relating to the Protection of Victims of International Armed
Conflicts (Protocol I)62 expands the scope of protection accorded
prisoners of war under Geneva Convention III by including wars fought for
self-determination. 163 Of particular relevance are those parts that provide
that "civilian objects shall not be the object of attack or reprisals";' 6 that
"starvation of civilians as a method of warfare is prohibited";' 65 and that
"6women shall be the object of special respect and shall be protected in
particular against rape."
1 66
The Protocol Relating to the Protection of Victims of Non-International
Armed Conflicts (Protocol 11)167 supplements Common Article Three of
the four Geneva Conventions. This Common Article Three prohibits, among
other things, "a) violence to life and person; b) taking of hostages"; and "c)
outrages upon personal dignity." The Protocol II itself outlaws
"violence to the life, health, and physical or mental well-being of persons;
collective punishments; taking of hostages; acts of terrorism; outrages upon
personal dignity; slavery ... ; pillage; [and] threats to commit any of these
acts."' 69 This litany of proscribed actions directly implicates the current
practice of ethnic cleansing, particularly in Bosnia-Herzegovina, where mass
and systematic rape, general intimidation of civilians, and plunder of private
property have become widespread.
g. The Torture Convention of 1984
On December 10, 1984, the United Nations General Assembly approved
the Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading
Treatment or Punishment. 70  Since that date, torture has been an
international crime, whether in time of war or peace, and, as such, "overlaps
with the 'grave breaches' provisions of the 1949 Geneva Conventions and
the 1977 Additional Protocols.' 7 ' The Torture Convention itself states
162. Protocol 1, supra note 71.
163. Protocol 1, supra note 71, art. 1(4).
164. Protocol 1, supra note 71, art. 52, quoted in Pearl, supra note 37, at 1395.
165. Protocol 1, supra note 71, art. 54, quoted in Pearl, supra note 37, at 1395.
166. Protocol I, supra note 7 1, art. 76(l), quoted in Pearl, supra note 37, at 1395-96.
167. Protocol II, supra note 71.
168. Pearl, supra note 37, at 1396 n.171.
169. Protocol 11, supra note 71, art. 4, quoted in Pearl, supra note 37, at 1396.
170. Torture Convention, supra note 72.
171. BASSIOUNI, supra note 60, at 477.
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that violent physical abuse becomes torture when it causes "severe pain and
suffering, whether physical or mental" and is intentionally inflicted on the
person to intimidate, coerce, or punish. 172 Article 2(3) imposes individual
responsibility by disallowing the defense of "superior's orders": "An order
from a superior officer or a public authority may not be invoked as a
justification of torture."'171 In addition, under article 2(2) a State Party to
the Torture Convention must take "effective legislative, administrative,
judicial or other measures to prevent acts of torture in any territory under its
jurisdiction." 1 74
Many of the human rights abuses in the former Yugoslavia constitute
torture under the Torture Convention definition when inflicted with the
requisite intent. Rape, forced prostitution and pregnancy, and other forms
of sexual abuse are all acts of physical and psychological violence that
inflict severe physical and mental pain and suffering. 5  The U.N.
International Tribunal has sufficient evidence of intentional sexual abuse
committed in the former Yugoslavia to apply the provisions of the Torture
Convention, in conjunction with the pertinent articles of the four Geneva
Conventions and Additional Protocols I and II, against those individuals
responsible for the acts.
h. The Statute of the U.N. International Tribunal
The most recent and obvious basis for the Tribunal's jurisdiction is the
"Statute of the International Tribunal," adopted on May 25, 1993.176
Secretary-General Boutros-Ghali, in a detailed report issued May 3,
1993, 177 concluded that establishing an international war crimes tribunal
by Security Council resolution would be the most effective and expeditious
means of carrying out the U.N. Charter's Chapter VII enforcement
measures. 178 He further concluded that establishing such a tribunal by a
172. Torture Convention, supra note 72, art. I.
173. Id., art. 2(3).
174. Id., art. 2(2).
175. Stephens, supra note 88, at 14.
176. S.C. Res. 827, U.N. SCOR, 48th Sess., 3217th mtg., U.N. Doc. SIRES/827 (1993)
[hereinafter Statute of the International Tribunal].
177. Report of the Secretary-General Pursuant to Paragraph 2 of Security Council Resolution
808, U.N. SCOR, U.N. Doc. S/25704 (1993).
178. Report on the International Tribunal to Adjudicate War Crimes Committed in the Former
Yugoslavia, supra note 134, at 9. See part IV.A.3.d: above for a more detailed examination of Chapter
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decision of the Security Council pursuant to Chapter VII would be legally
justified based on the "object and purpose" of the decision itself and on
previous Security Council determinations that: 1) the conflict in the former
Yugoslavia constitutes a threat to international peace and security; 2) all
parties to the conflict are bound to comply with international humanitarian
law; and 3) the establishment of a war crimes tribunal would contribute to
the restoration of international peace and security by ending the violations
of fundamental human rights in the former Yugoslavia.'79 The Statute of
the International Tribunal's legal basis in Chapter VII of the U.N. Charter
and in previous resolutions concerning the conflict in the former
Yugoslavia 80 thus justifies the Security Council's establishment of the
United Nations International Tribunal to Adjudicate War Crimes Committed
in the Former Yugoslavia.
B. The Effectiveness of the U.N. International Tribunal
1. Preface
The United Nations, by creating a legally valid international war crimes
tribunal to indict, prosecute, and sentence individual violators of
international humanitarian law in the former Yugoslavia, possesses an
unprecedented opportunity in its role as representative of the world
community to fulfill its moral imperative to "promot[e] and encourag[e]
respect for human rights and for fundamental freedoms for all without
distinction as to race, sex, language, or religion."'' Moreover, the
establishment of the U.N. International Tribunal provides a means of
defining individual criminal responsibility in such a way that political
leaders and military commanders who order the commission of crimes or
who know of them but fail to take the steps necessary to prevent or repress
them are themselves culpable.'82
However, the United Nations International Tribunal must surmount a
variety of obstacles before it can truly measure up to its envisioned potential
VII's enforcemefit provisions.
179. Id.
180. See supra notes 42, 45, and 47.
181. U.N. CHARTER, supra note 131, art. 1(3).
182. Aryeh Neier, Watching Rights: War Crimes, 256 THE NATION 825 (1993).
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and assume an effective and credible role. The "success" of Nuremberg was
marred by the application of ex post facto laws and by allegations of judicial
partiality derived from "victors' justice." The U.N. International Tribunal
confronts very different, but no less daunting, hurdles than those that existed
nearly fifty years ago at Nuremberg. The following Note section examines
these new issues.
2. Lack of Authority and the Need to Negotiate Peace May
Eviscerate the Tribunal's Mandate
One significant problem for the Tribunal is its minimal authority to
punish, paper threats notwithstanding."' Defendants who fail to appear
before the Tribunal once called or who ignore subpoenas risk little: "the
states that shelter them merely face Security Council sanctions; their leaders
risk nothing worse than isolation."' 4 Serbia, instigator and supporter of
the most heinous atrocities, is already under U.N. sanctions and has little
reason to regard the United Nations seriously in light of the U.N.'s appalling
ineffectiveness in Bosnia-Herzegovina.185 Further, because the Tribunal
may not try defendants in absentia (in contrast to Nuremberg), unless the
indicted offenders on all sides surrender, there will be no trials anyway.'86
In addition, the prospect of trials ever occurring is weakened by the
need to negotiate a comprehensive peace with the same individuals who are
responsible for the war crimes." 7 Professor M. Cherif Bassiouni notes
that "there is an obvious incongruence between pursuing a political
settlement option and a justice option. Up to a point, they can be pursued
in tandem. There comes a point where they may become incompatible."' 88
Arguably, whenever a Yugoslav peace agreement is on the table, the
Tribunal will assume a secondary role, a political reality that demonstrates
one fundamental difference between the Nuremberg Tribunal and the new
United Nations Tribunal: the former pursued those who had lost the war,
whereas the latter must prosecute the self-proclaimed victors. 9  The




187. Meron, supra note 3, at 133.
188. Bass, supra note 49, at 13.
189. Id.
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Bosnian Serbs will almost certainly insist on assurances of immunity before
they sign a peace agreement. 9
Should this scenario arise, the United Nations International Tribunal
must consider the ramifications of forgoing justice for peace. Is there a
moral obligation for a civilized society to respect and enforce the laws it
creates in the name of basic human rights and dignity? Or should those
who commit atrocities during war be allowed to "extort amnesty in
exchange for peace?"''
3. Relevant Evidence is Unavailable or Fast Disappearing
The U.N. International Tribunal confronts a monumental hurdle in its
quest to gather incriminating evidence for use at trial. Unlike the
Nuremberg Trials, where prosecutors had the benefit of the Nazis'
propensity for recording their heinous acts in diaries and memoranda,
92
the ability to find evidence in the former Yugoslavia leaves much to be
desired. To make matters worse, the United Nations Commission of Experts
charged with providing evidence of violations is equipped with forces that
are dwarfed in comparison to the hundreds of lawyers and investigators that
were available for the Nuremberg prosecution in 1945.193 In general, the
ability to obtain tangible evidence has been hampered by 1) a lack of control
over areas where offenses have been committed;' 94 2) blatant tampering
by Serbs with files containing crucial information on atrocities committed
during the conflict;' 95 and 3) gathering of evidence by nongovernmental
190. Meron, supra note 3, at 133.
191. Neier, supra note 182, at 825.
192. Brudno, supra note 115, at 635.
193. Meron, supra note 3, at 125.
194. For example, one of the best pieces of evidence for the Tribunal is a mass grave outside
Vukovar, Croatia, reportedly full of approximately 200 Croatians dragged from a hospital and summarily
executed by Serbs with AK-47s. Bass, supra note 49, at 14. Yet, because the area is not secure,
outsiders investigating war crimes take their lives into their own hands. Further, as Professor and
Commission of Experts member M. Cherif Bassiouni points out, simple logistics in such a situation are
a nightmare: "You've got 174 bodies in a country, torn by war, where you can't even get a plastic bag.
What are you going to wrap the bodies in? Where will they be taken? How will you get them there?
Who will perform tests?" Rosemarie Buchanan, Battling the Crimes of War, STUDENT LAW., May 1993,
at 14, 15.
195. For example, on October 19, 1992, Serbian President Slobodan Milosevi6 reportedly seized
control of his country's governmental files, many of which contained information on war crimes
committed during the current fighting. Morning Edition (Nat'l Public Radio Broadcast, Oct. 23, 1992),
transcript available in LEXIS, News Library, NPR File, reprinted in Pearl, supra note 37, at 1406.
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organizations (NGOs), which do not always have the ability to marshal
evidence for criminal proceedings.196
The picture, however, is not entirely bleak. Professor Bassiouni, a
member of the United Nations Commission of Experts, has established and
oversees an ever-expanding war crimes computer database at De Paul
University's International Human Rights Institute." 7 On January 17,
1994, 1000 pages of documents comprising 400 eyewitness accounts of
atrocities committed in Bosnia were made available to the Tribunal by U.S.
Ambassador to the United Nations Madeleine Albright, while in early
February the contents of 500 refugee interviews were turned over to the
Tribunal for consideration.198  Also, in early February 1994, an
international team of criminal prosecutors arrived in Croatia to take the
depositions of approximately 200 alleged rape victims. 99 These women's
testimonies could provide the basis for the individual prosecution of senior
Bosnian-Serb military and political leaders for supporting the use of mass
and systematic rape as a component of ethnic cleansing.2"
4. Obtaining Personal Jurisdiction over the Defendants Will Be
Difficult if Not Impossible
Naming the defendants to be prosecuted by the Nuremberg International
Military Tribunal was relatively simple: those individuals indicted had been
selected from the top leadership of the Nazi regime and represented all of
the organizations labelled criminal in the indictment itself.2"' The trials
of lesser criminals were left to the countries in which their crimes had been
196. Professor Meron notes that "the information normally gathered by NGOs and the evidence
necessary to secure a criminal conviction are significantly different." Meron, supra note 3, at 132.
Nonetheless, bodies like the Zenica, Bosnia-based "War Crimes Commission" are gathering evidence
crucial to laying the foundation for war crimes trials. This group, which has investigators throughout
Bosnia and Croatia, has produced a list of 1350 war criminals, 120 mass graves, and 20,000 murders.
Michael Christie, Kinkel Says Will Pursue Bosnia War Crimes Suspects, Reuters World Service, Feb. 24,
1994, available in LEXIS, News Library, WIRES File. The Bosnian government itself has a list of
11,000 suspects. Catherine Toups, Database of War Crimes Lays Groundwork for Trials, WASH. TIMES,
Feb. 15, 1994, at Al.
197. Atlas, supra note 89, at 6. U.N. Secretary-General Boutros-Ghali agreed that the De Paul
institute would become the U.N. agent for assimilating reports on atrocities committed in the former
Yugoslavia.
198. Kriegsverbrecher-Tribunal, supra note 8.
199. Atlas, supra note 89, at I.
200. Id. at 6.
201. Harris, supra note 9, at 245.
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committed. 21 2 There are far fewer high-profile defendants to indict in the
case of the former Yugoslavia. In December 1992, the Bush Administration
named five specific individuals2. 3 and then referred to other individuals
only by the acts they had committed.2" What differentiates the U.N.
International Tribunal from the Nuremberg IMT is that in theory the former
is supposed to try all defendants, not just the major political and military
leaders-there are no additional, country-specific tribunals to try the lesser
criminals.
Exercising personal jurisdiction over those charged with violating
international humanitarian law in the former Yugoslavia will be a daunting
task. Perhaps key will be the issuance of highly detailed indictments,
through which the prosecution could pressure Serbia (or other States
harboring accused individuals) to extradite named defendants. 20 5 A State
that refused to turn over a named defendant to stand trial would face
international sanctions.0 6 However, a State like Serbia, which is already
under U.N. sanctions, will undoubtedly trivialize any indictment and demand
amnesty in exchange for peace. In addition, the region of the former
Yugoslavia is not under the control of powers who could bring the
defendants to trial (as was the case at Nuremberg).2 7 Finally, the chances
of prosecuting indicted defendants is lessened by the Statute of the
International Tribunal itself, which prohibits trials in absentia.2 ' Because
Serbia and other States may choose to harbor indicted war criminals,
sanctions notwithstanding, the U.N. International Tribunal ultimately may
be unable to obtain even the slightest form of personal jurisdiction over
anybody at all.
202. Id. at 240.
203. These five were Serbian President Slobodan Milosevi6, Bosnian-Serb leader Radovan
Karadzic, General Ratko Mladi6, commander of the Bosnian-Serb military forces, and two Serb
paramilitary leaders, Vojislav Seselj and Zeljko Raznjatovi6. Annika Savill and Tony Barber, West
Intensifies the Pressure over Bosnia, TIlE INDEPENDENT (London), Dec. 17, 1992, at 1.
204. Some of these individuals were the commander of a Serb-run detention camp; a Bosnian Serb
who confessed to killing 230 civilians; members of a Croatian paramilitary force accused of attacking
a bus convoy of Serbian women and children, killing half of them; and the commander of a Croat-run
detention camp where 15 Serbs were beaten to death. Elaine Sciolino, U.S. Names Figures It Wants
Charged with War Crimes, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 17, 1992, at AI, A22.
205. Neier, supra note 182, at 825.
206. Id.
207. James Podgers, Repeating Nuremberg, A.B.A. J., Oct. 1993, at 121.
208. Atlas, supra note 89, at 6.
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5. The Requirement of Fairness and Impartiality
In order to constitute a valid precedent for future ad hoc tribunals or for
a permanent international criminal court, the United Nations International
Tribunal must ensure that all defendants receive a fair and impartial trial
before a neutral and representative panel of judges. The Tribunal must
observe the basic fundamentals of due process, including the defendants'
right to counsel, to present evidence on their own behalf, to cross-examine
hostile witnesses, and to appeal to an appropriate appellate court.20 9
Fairness and credibility also dictate that all parties involved in the current
conflict-Serbs, Croats, and Bosnian Serbs, Croats, and Muslims-be
investigated and prosecuted for verifiable war crimes.1 °
The Statute of the International Tribunal,2"' like the Nuremberg
Charter,1 2 contains provisions explicitly designed to ensure a fair trial.
For example, under the Statute the accused has the following rights: 1) an
entitlement to a fair and public hearing on the charges brought against
him; 21 3 2) the benefit of a presumption of innocence;2"4 3) the right to
choose counsel and to communicate with him; 215 4) the right to be
informed in detail and in a language he understands of the charges brought
against him;216 5) the right to trial without undue delay;217 6) the right
to be present at his own trial; 2" 7) the right to examine witnesses against
him and to obtain the attendance of witnesses on his behalf;2 9 8) the right
to the free assistance of an interpreter if necessary; 220 and 9) freedom from
compulsion to testify against himself or to confess guilt.22'
In addition, the Tribunal may not impose the death penalty,222 but may
only hand down jail terms to be served in the prisons of countries offering
209. Meron, supra note 3, at 125.
210. Id.
211. Statute of International Tribunal, supra note 176.
212. Nuremberg Charter, supra note 16, at 294.
213. Statute of the International Tribunal, supra note 176, art. 21(2).
214. Id., art. 21(3).
215. Id., art. 21(4)(b).
216. Id., art. 21(4)(a).
217. Id., art. 21(4Xc).
218. Id., art. 21(4)(d).
219. Id., art. 21(4)(e).
220. Id., art. 21(4)(f).
221. Id., art. 21( 4)(g).
222. Kriegsverbrecher-Tribunal, supra note 8.
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penal facilities.223  Finally, the Statute prevents subsequent trials in any
national courts for serious violations of international humanitarian law,224
limits the power of the Tribunal to retry persons already prosecuted for the
same offense before a national court,225 and provides for an Appeals
Chamber to hear appeals from individuals convicted by the Tribunal.226
6. Possible Solutions
a. The U.N. International Tribunal
The Tribunal represents an excellent opportunity to vindicate
international humanitarian law by prosecuting those individuals responsible
for committing serious human rights abuses in the former Yugoslavia. Its
moral imperative, backed by a legally valid United Nations mandate, enables
the Tribunal to reaffirm the sanctity of basic human rights for all
individuals, regardless of race, nationality, gender, or ethnicity.
Unfortunately, however, the prospects for the Tribunal's success are
rather bleak. As noted above in B (2), (3), and (4), significant obstacles
exist that in all likelihood will prevent the Tribunal from assuming any
manner of effective, precedent-setting role. As the war continues and
casualities mount on all sides, there will be an increasing emphasis on
effecting a comprehensive peace. The need to negotiate peace with the
same individuals charged with war crimes presents a regrettable dilemma:
how to prosecute Yugoslav war criminals when assurances of immunity will
almost certainly be a precondition to any peace agreement they sign?
In addition, problems in the following areas will eviscerate any exisiting
U.N. mandate: 1) acquiring, cataloging, and preserving pertinent
incriminating evidence; 2) obtaining personal jurisdiction over any named
defendants; 3) overcoming global apathy toward the situation in the former
Yugoslavia; 4) securing a neutral Tribunal setting closer to the conflict in
order to maximize accessibility to the trial; and 5) agreeing on a time of trial
223. Regenstreif, supra note 54. In early 1994 construction began on a holding pen intended to
house suspected war criminals for trial. The pen, composed of twelve cells, is situated next to a prison
in The Hague and will be guarded by United Nations military personnel. Ex-Yougoslavie, supra note
54.
224. Statute of the International Tribunal, supra note 176, art. 10(I).
225. Id., art. 10(2).
226. Id., art. 25(1).
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that will be neither too soon before hostilities cease nor too late after a
peace settlement already has been reached. The U.N. International Tribunal
will be relegated to the role of farcical marionette: good for show but
dependent on others for life and easily discardable when no longer needed.
b. A Permanent International Criminal Court
The success of the ad hoc United Nations International Tribunal to
Adjudicate War Crimes Committed in the Former Yugoslavia may have
direct implications for the creation of a permanent international criminal
court. Attempts to create a tribunal of this nature to deter aggression and
terrorism date to the years following World War I. However, it was not
until the genocide and atrocities of World War II were disclosed that the
Allies created such a court: the International Military Tribunal at
Nuremberg,227 which at best was an ad hoc solution. Yet, despite the
unanimous affirmation of the Nuremberg Principles by the United Nations
in late 1946,228 some sovereign States, particularly those who had emerged
from World War II as military powers, were not prepared to be bound by
a universal rule of international criminal law.229 Nonetheless, the newly-
created U.N. International Law Commission (ILC) concluded that a
permanent international criminal court was needed and could be created.230
In response, the U.N. General Assembly prepared two drafts of an
international criminal court statute in 1951 and 1953,231 both of which
were subsequently tabled pending definition of the crime of
"aggression. ' '232
A primary reason for the General Assembly's inaction over the last forty
years has been its inability to reach a consensus on the contents of a Draft
Code of Crimes, which would provide the jurisdictional basis for a
permanent international criminal court. Minimal progress has occurred since
the U.N. General Assembly tabled the 1954 Draft Code of Offences Against
227. Benjamin B. Ferencz, An International Criminal Code and Court: Where They Stand and
Where They're Going, 30 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 375, 382-83 (1992).
228. See G.A. Res. 95(1), supra note 58.
229. Ferencz, supra note 227, at 383.
230. SUNGA, supra note 56, at 118.
231. Id.
232. M. Cherif Bassiouni, Nuremberg Forty Years After: An Introduction, 18 CASE W. RES. J.
INT'L L. 261, 264 (986).
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the Peace and Security of Mankind. 3  In 1982, the ILC appointed
Doudou Thiam, a.former Minister of Srnrgal, as Special Rapporteur for the
draft code; each year thereafter he issued reports describing problems or
offering drafts of the provisions the ILC members were debating.234 The
August 1990 Iraqi invasion of Kuwait prompted calls for a "New World
Order" where the rule of law would replace the law of the jungle. By July
1991, the ILC, under pressure to produce something tangible, succeeded in
completing a first reading of a Draft Code of Crimes. 235 However, the
ILC did not submit draft articles for a permanent international criminal court
in this report.236
The recent atrocities in the former Yugoslavia have renewed interest in
the creation of a permanent international criminal court. On November 25,
1992, the U.N. General Assembly adopted a resolution that requested the
ILC to make the formulation of a draft statute a priority.237 During the
1993 summer session of the ILC, a Working Group on the Draft Statute for
an International Criminal Court completed a report and draft statute, 238
which were to be considered by the General Assembly during its forty-
eighth session. The Draft Statute established the composition of the
Court, 239 the standards for election and dismissal of judges, 240 a list of
crimes defined by treaties over which the Court has jurisdiction, 24' and
other rules governing jurisdictional issues.242
Yet, despite the recent progress made toward creating a permanent
international criminal court, many States most likely will be loath to take
any decisive action toward establishing such a court, regardless of how
effective the current ad hoc U.N. International Tribunal is. This resistance
could exist for a number of reasons: 1) States may be reluctant to limit
their sovereignty by supporting the creation of an international criminal
233. Draft Code of Offences Against the Peace and Security ofManhind, U.N. GAOR, 9th Sess.,
504th plen. mtg., Supp. No. 7, U.N. Doe. 898(IX)(1954).
234. Ferencz, supra note 227, at 378-79.
235. Id. at 379.
236. Id. at 380.
237. G.A. Res. 47/33, U.N. GAOR, 47th Sess., at 4, U.N. Doc. A/47/584 (1992).
238. International Law Commission Revised Report of the Working Group on the Draft Statute
for an International Criminal Court, U.N. Doe. A/CN.4/L.490 (1993).
239. Id., art. 5.
240. Id., arts. 6, 7, II.
241. Id.. art. 22.
242. Id., arts. 23, 24, 25, 26.
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court with general jurisdiction;243 2) States may prefer not to hand over
drug traffickers and terrorists to an international court, choosing instead to
use multilateral extradition treaties;2 and 3) States may fear that any such
international court will be a highly politicized body and, thus, court
composition, procedures, and punishment will be inherently unfair.245 It
is imperative that the United Nations approve a final Draft Code of Crimes
and that it attempt to reduce its Member States' resistance to the creation of
a permanent international criminal court; otherwise, chances that such a
court will ever exist are slim to none.
V. CONCLUSION
By early spring of 1994, some two years after full-scale war had begun
in the former Yugoslavia, negotiating a peaceful resolution to the conflict
had become a top priority. The February 5 murder by mortar shell of sixty-
six civilians in a crowded Sarajevo open-air market 246 outraged the world
community and prompted U.N. Secretary-General Boutros-Ghali to ask
NATO for authorization to order punitive air strikes against Serbian gun
positions around Sarajevo.247
On February 9, NATO declared that Bosnian Serb forces had to
withdraw or hand over their heavy guns within twelve miles of Sarajevo by
February 20 or risk aerial attack by NATO jets.248  By the deadline the
Serbs had complied.249  The operation was so successful that American,
Russian, and European diplomats resolved to intensify their efforts to
achieve a negotiated end to the war.250 The first concrete result of this
new initiative was the signing in Washington on March 1 of an agreement
243. SUNGA, supra note 56, at 119.
244. Ferencz, supra note 227, at 387.
245. Id. at 388.
246. At least 66 were killed and 200 others wounded in the worst massacre in Sarajevo since the
siege of the city began in April of 1992. John Kifner, 66 Die as Shell Wrecks Sarajevo Market, N.Y.
TIMES, Feb. 6, 1994, at Al.
247. Paul Lewis, Terror in Sarajevo: U.N. Seeks Power for Bosnia Strikes, N.Y. TIMEs, Feb. 7,
1994, at AS.
248. Nato's Risky Step, N.Y. TIMEs, Feb. 10, 1994, at A22.
249. John Kifner, Conflict in the Balkans: U.N. Says Serbs Are Complying with Arms Ultimatum,
N.Y. TIMEs, Feb. 21. 1994. at Al, A6.
250. Craig R. Whitney, Conflict in the Balkans: Diplomats See a New Chance to End Bosnia
War, N.Y. TIMEs, Feb. 23, 1994, at AS.
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between Bosnian Muslim and Croat leaders that envisioned the creation of
a loose confederation of each side's respective territory.25 '
Nevertheless, while the peace process accelerated, the U.N. International
Tribunal seemed to stand still. By mid-February 1994, the court still had
no chief prosecutor, no investigators of its own, and no final budget to pay
for its operations. Further, the eleven judges had just started to work on
rules of procedure and were months away from conducting any trials. 2 2
In the meantime, the Tribunal's mandate had been undermined in a
variety of ways. In 1993, Bosnian Muslim leader Fikret Abdi6 signed an
accord with Serbia that provided that each side in the conflict would
prosecute its own war criminals and that each side would regard the conflict
as an internal matter, which would preclude the application of international
law. 253  Further, several countries have conducted or plan to conduct war
crimes trials of their own, seeing no need to send the suspects to The Hague
for incarceration until the U.N. International Tribunal begins to hear
cases.25 4 Finally, in a move that may have revealed the U.N.'s weakening
resolve to pursue the prosecution of war criminals, Secretary-General
Boutros-Ghali indicated in mid-February 1994 that he expected the U.N.
Commission of Experts charged with investigating war crimes in the former
251. Elaine Sciolino, U.S. and Russians Broker New Pacts for a Bosnia Peace, N.Y. TIMES, Mar.
2, 1994, at AI, AIO.
252. Terry Atlas, Atrocity Docket: U.N. Has Done Little to Prosecute Villains in Bosnia, CHI.
TRIB., Feb. 13, 1994, s.4, at I.
253. However, the U.N. Tribunal could still use the substance of the Genocide and Geneva
Conventions to prosecute suspected war criminals-international law overrides national law in this case.
Sadruddin Aga Khan, War Crimes in Bosnia: International Community's Sole Pledge for Justice Gutted,
OTTAWA CITIZEN, Feb. 17, 1994, at Al l.
254. In March of 1993, a Bosnian military court condemned two Serb militiamen to death by
firing squad for war crimes against Muslims. One defendant, Borislav Herak, confessed to thirty-five
murders and sixteen rapes. Sentenced to Die, MACLEAN'S, Apr. 12, 1993, at 19. Two Charged in War
Crimes Trial, CHI. DAILY L. BULL., Mar. 12, 1993, at I. In mid-February 1994, Germany's federal
prosecutor's office became the first body outside the former Yugoslavia to arrest a Serb suspected of
committing atrocities. Dusan Tadid was charged with assisting in genocide at the Omarska detention
camp, where up to fifteen prisoners died each day from shootings, beatings, and illness. Christie, supra
note 196. In a related matter, a Bosnian Muslim who had fled to Denmark was charged in mid-February
1994 with the murder of Croats in a detention camp near the city of Mostar. He was recognized when
he was admitted to a refugee center near Copenhagen full of former inmates from the camp. The Danes
saw no reason to turn him over to the U.N. International Tribunal. Danes Accuse Bosnian Moslem
Refitgee of War Crimes, Reuters World Service, Feb. 18, 1994, available in LEXIS, News Library,
WIRES File.
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Yugoslavia to finish its work by April. Should this happen, the legal
authority for much of the current evidence-gathering would be in doubt. 255
Creating the U.N. International Tribunal was a laudable move.
However, today's realpolitik most likely will prevent the Tribunal from
being a truly effective organ of justice. Pressure to negotiate an agreeable
settlement to the bloody two-year-old war, coupled with demands for
immunity from suspected war criminals-peace negotiators, will probably
undermine any possibility of trying those responsible for serious human
rights abuses.
Nonetheless, the Tribunal should not be disbanded before it issues
detailed indictments. The atrocities in the former Yugoslavia deserve the
world's attention not only because of their appalling nature, but also because
they present an opportunity to vindicate international humanitarian law and
the established customs and laws of war. Egomaniacal bullies should not
be permitted to further their petty territorial ambitions by targeting for
extermination innocent civilians who happen to stand in their way,
regardless of where they are in the world.
The United Nations International Tribunal to Adjudicate War Crimes
Committed in the Former Yugoslavia is an admittedly imperfect, ad hoc
solution to a regrettable wartime phenomenon that more properly deserves
attention from a permanent international criminal court. Yet, the U.N.
International Tribunal should not be abandoned; if anything, its mere
existence represents the world's attempt to acknowledge the inviolability of
certain fundamental human rights by punishing those who choose to abuse
them.
255. For example, the authority to complete the exhumation of the Croat mass grave near
Vukovar. one of the most damning pieces of evidence available, would be in doubt. Khan, supra note
253, at All.
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VI. ADDENDUM
In April 1994 the five-member United Nations Commission of Experts
headed by De Paul University law professor M. Cherif Bassiouni concluded
its evidence-gathering activities on the Yugoslav atrocities. The resulting
3,300-page final report (submitted on May 2 to United Nations Secretary-
General Boutros-Ghali) detailed specific cases of serious violations including
mass executions, rapes, ethnic cleansing, torture, and acts of wanton
destruction.2 6 By early June the United Nations had released a fifty-seven
page version25 of the Commission's report that specifically accused the
Bosnian Serbs of crimes against humanity, particularly in northwest
Herzegovina. 258  The Commission of Experts meanwhile had submitted
65,000 pages of documents, 300 hours of videotape, and a computerized
database to the Tribunal in The Hague.259
On July 8, after a frustrating and demoralizing yearlong search, the
United Nations Security Council unanimously approved the appointment of
a high-profile South African Supreme Court judge as chief prosecutor for
the Tribunal.260 The judge, Richard J. Goldstone, assumed office on
August 15, 1994, and immediately had to cope with a process that has been
ineffective at best. The proposed budget for 1994-1995 is $32.5 million, of
which only $11 million has been appropriated to date. Almost all of the
budget ($32 million) consists of salaries for the judges and lawyers (the
eleven judges earn $145,000 and essentially have been inactive since
January 1994).261 More telling is the proposed budget for the prosecutor's
256. Jean-Michel Stoullig, Commission of Experts Presents Yugoslav War Crime Report, Agence
France Presse, Apr. 16, 1994, available in LEXIS, News Library, CURNWS File.
257. Serbs Planned and Carried Out "Ethnic Cleansing" UN Reports, Agence France Presse,
June 3, 1994, available in LEXIS, News Library, CURNWS File.
258. Calling a Crime a Crime: For Both Moral and Political Reasons. World Must Act on U.N.
Report on Balkans Atrocities, L.A. TIMES, June 19, 1994, at M4. The report concentrated on the ethnic
cleansing of more than 50,000 people from the town of Prijedor in northwest Herzegovina.
259. Paul Lewis, U.N. Report Accuses Serbs of "Crimes Against Humanity", N.Y. TIMES, June
3. 1994, at A3. The U.S. State Department has corroborated these submissions with several thousand
detailed pages of its own. Robert Marquand, Sandbagging a Probe of Bosnia War Crimes, SACRAMENTO
BEE, Sept. 4, 1994, at F03 (Forum), available in LEXIS, News Library, CURNWS File.
260. Paul Lewis, South African Is to Prosecute Balkan War Crimes, N.Y. TIMES, July 9, 1994,
at A2. The judge, Richard J. Goldstone, had led a series of investigations into violence in the black
townships and had headed the Commission Concerning the Prevention of Public Violence and
Intimidation. Wilbur G. Landrey, War Crimes Tribunal: More Than a Fig Lea]., ST. PETERSBURG
TIMES, Sept. 4, 1994, at IA (National), available in LEXIS, News Library, CURNWS File.
261. Marquand, supra note 259, at F03 (Forum).
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office: $8.7 million, of which only $550,000 has been slated for
investigations.262
Yet, the situation is not entirely bleak. Germany, Denmark, and Austria
each holds a suspect who eventually will be turned over to the Tribunal in
The Hague,263 twenty-four prison cells attached to the Tribunal's
headquarters are ready to receive those indicted,26 Germany has launched
war crimes investigations against fifty-one Serbs currently residing within
its borders and has indicated its intention to enact a law allowing direct
extradition of war criminals to the Tribunal,265 Bosnia and Croatia have
pledged to hand over suspects and to open branches of the Tribunal in their
respective capitals,2 6 and INTERPOL has recently resolved to cooperate
with the Tribunal (war crimes suspects who are not extradited by their
mother countries will be subject to an international indictment backed by
INTERPOL).267
On November 7, 1994, the United Nations International Tribunal handed
down its first indictment and ordered the arrest of Dragan Nikoli6, the
Bosnian Serb commander of a detention camp near the eastern Bosnian town
of Vlasenica. Nikoli6 is charged with overseeing the murder of perhaps
3,000 Bosnian Muslims. 268  One day later, a three-judge panel approved
262. Id.
263. Landrey, supra note 260, at I A (National). See supra note 254 for text regarding the former
Bosnian Muslim camp guard detained in Copenhagen on accusations of war crimes; the Danish Court
of Appeal was scheduled to hear his case on November 7, 1994. Ouverture du procis d'un Serbe accuse
de ginocide en ex- Yougoslavie, Agence France Presse, Oct. 20, 1994, available in LEXIS, World Library,
PRESSE File. On October 20, 1994, the much-publicized trial of a Serb accused of genocide began
before an Austrian appellate court in Salzburg. The case is unique because it represents the first trial in
a foreign country of a Yugoslav war criminal. Erster Prozess wegen Kriegsverbrechen in Bosnien,
Siiddeutsche Zeitung, at 7, available in LEXIS, World Library, ZEITNG File. The U.N. International
Tribunal was informed of the trial but did not demand extradition of the accused, viewing the case as
"less significant" than others. Ouverture du procs d'un Serbe accusg de genocide en ex-Yougoslavie,
supra note 263. Unfortunately, the first day of the proceeding was marred by hearsay evidence,
translation errors, and contradictory statements and affidavits. The presiding judges adjourned the trial
until December 5 to allow a search for more witnesses. World in Brief. 48 Die as Bridge in Seoul
Collapses, ATLANTA 3. & CONST., Oct. 21, 1994, at A8, available in LEXIS, News Library, CURNWS
File.
264. Id.
265. L 'Allemagne pripare une loi pour extrader les criminels de guerre, Agence France Presse,
Nov. 2, 1994, available in LEXIS, World Library, PRESSE File.
266. Le conflit dans l'ex-Yougoslavie; Le Tribunal international n 'entend juger que des cas
"exemplaires ", LE MONDE, Oct. 13, 1994, available in LEXIS, World Library, PRESSE File.
267. Branko Milinkovit, Yugoslavia: Mixed Reaction to War Crimes Tribunal Visit, Inter Press
Service, Oct. II, 1994, available in LEXIS, News Library, CURNWS File.
268. Robert Block, War Crimes Tribunal Makes First Move, THE INDEPENDENT (London), Nov.
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a formal request to the German government to extradite Dusan Tadi, 26 9
a Bosnian Serb arrested in Germany in February 1994 and charged with
ordering the torture and killing of Muslims during a campaign of ethnic
cleansing in northern Bosnia in 1992.27 This indictment, while little more
than a public formality designed to convince the world community that the
Tribunal is functioning as intended, is nonetheless important symbolically
and psychologically for the Tribunal's small staff of sixty,27 ' for those
individuals and organizations around the world who so relentlessly gathered
incriminating evidence, for the survivors of the atrocities in the former
Yugoslavia, and for those war criminals who now face the possibility of
having to account for their deeds at the first trial, currently scheduled to take
place in March 1995.2"2
8, 1994, at 10, available in LEXIS, News Library, CURNWS File.
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Yugoslavia 's War. Therefore No "Victor's Justice, " Judge Goldstone Tells Robert Block in The Hague,
THE INDEPENDENT (London), Oct. 26. 1994, at 9, available in LEXIS, News Library, CURNWS File.
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